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Von Dardel v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:
An Expansive Interpretation of the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act
As the level of interdependence among the United States and
other nations grows, the need for a practical and balanced approach
to the doctrine of sovereign immunity by the courts of the United
States becomes more important. Because of liberal U.S. discovery
rules and often lucrative jury awards, U.S. courts are an attractive
place for foreign plaintiffs to bring suit. For this reason, U.S. courts
must maintain a standard for the consistent application of the sover-
eign immunity doctrine to limit the class of foreign plaintiffs who
may bring suit in the United States.
The privilege of sovereign immunity, which exempts foreign
sovereigns from the jurisdiction of U.S. courts, is governed by the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA).' The FSIA establishes a
presumption of sovereign immunity for foreign sovereigns subject to
a series of exceptions enumerated in the Act. 2 If the conduct of the
foreign sovereign falls within one of these exceptions, a U.S. court
may exercise jurisdiction over the foreign state.
In Von Dardel v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 3 the U.S. District
Court for the District of Columbia examined the sovereign immunity
defense. The court addressed the issue whether a foreign state may
assert the defense of sovereign immunity for acts performed solely
within its own territory. The court held that the sovereign immunity
defense was not available to the Soviet Union in a suit brought by
two foreign plaintiffs for conduct performed within the Soviet
Union.4 The court determined, therefore, that it had personal and
subject matter jurisdiction.
The facts of the Von Dardel case date back to the final months of
World War II. In July 1944, Raoul Wallenberg joined the Swedish
diplomatic corps in Budapest, Hungary to assist Sweden and the
United States in their efforts to save the lives of thousands of Jewish
I Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332(a)(2)-(4),
1391(o, 1441(d), 1602-11 (1982) [hereinafter Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act].
2 28 U.S.C. §§ 1604, 1605 (1982). See infra notes 33-38 and accompanying text.
3 623 F. Supp. 246 (D.D.C. 1985).
4 Id.
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people from extermination by the Nazis. 5 While exercising the pro-
tection of his full diplomatic immunity, Wallenberg used money and
other means of support to save nearly one hundred thousand Jews.
Six months after arriving in Hungary, Wallenberg was arrested by
the invading armies of the Soviet Union. His precise whereabouts
and status have not been ascertained to date.6 In 1957 a Soviet offi-
cial publicly claimed that Wallenberg had died in a Soviet prison
nearly ten years earlier. 7 During the many years following his disap-
pearance, however, a steady flow of reports from former Soviet pris-
oners indicated that Wallenberg did not die in 1947 as the Soviets
had claimed, but that he remained alive and in the Soviets' custody.8
Guy Von Dardel, Wallenberg's half brother, and Sven Hag-
stromer, Wallenberg's Swedish appointed legal guardian, both
Swedish citizens, brought suit in a U.S. district court against the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Soviet Union) for the unlawful
seizure, imprisonment, and possible death of Raoul Wallenberg.9
The summons, complaint, and a discovery request with a notice of
suit and Russian translation of the documents were processed
through the U.S. Department of State. This information was then
delivered to and served upon the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs
in Moscow in accordance with the FSIA. 10 Because the Soviet
Union's only response to the documents was a diplomatic note to the
U.S. embassy in Moscow asserting absolute sovereign immunity in all
non-Soviet courts, the plaintiffs moved for a default judgment."I
The court determined that it had personal jurisdiction since the de-
fendant could be found in the United States through its agents and
instrumentalities. 12 Furthermore, the court determined that subject
matter jurisdiction was appropriate under the FSIA since this was a
civil action arising under the "laws, or treaties of the United
States.' 3
The Von Dardel court premised its finding of subject matter juris-
diction under the FSIA on four bases. First, since the Soviet Union
5 Id. at 248.
6 Id. at 249.
7 Id. Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko admitted that Wallenberg had been
a prisoner in the Soviet Union. However, in a note delivered to the Swedish embassy in
Moscow dated February 6, 1957, Gromyko stated that Wallenberg had died of natural
causes on July 17, 1947. Id.
8 Id. at 249-50.
9 Id. at 250.
1o Id. The provisions for service of process are set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1608 (1982).
1 1 Von Dardel, 623 F. Supp. at 250.
12 Id. The court noted that its assertion of personal jurisdiction must comport with
the due process requirements of International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
13 Von Dardel, 623 F. Supp. at 250 (citing Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 502 F. Supp.
259, 266 (D.D.C. 1980)). The court also found subject matter jurisdiction under the Alien
Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1982). The analysis of this statute is beyond the scope
of this note.
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deliberately chose to forego raising sovereign immmunity as an af-
firmative defense, it lost whatever entitlement to immunity it had
under the terms of the Act. 14 Second, since Congress intended to
incorporate the principles of international law into the FSIA, the So-
viet Union's alleged violations of those principles precluded its as-
sertion of immunity.15 Third, since the FSIA provides that immunity
is subject to international agreements to which the United States is a
party' 6 and acts by the Soviet Union have contravened such existing
international agreements, the FSIA could not shield the defendant
from liability.' 7 Fourth, through its ratification of certain human
rights agreements, the Soviet Union implicitly waived its immunity
for violations of those agreements.18
Although the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act clarifies the cir-
cumstances under which the sovereign immunity defense is applica-
ble, the history of the sovereign immunity doctrine is tumultuous.
The classic expression of the doctrine was first set forth in The
Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon. 19 In defining the fundamental princi-
ple of sovereign immunity, the Supreme Court held that immunity
for foreign warships coming into American ports was implied, and
that while operating within U.S. territory and acting in a friendly
manner, all ships should be exempt from the jurisdiction of U.S.
courts.2 0 The Court added, however, that the nation extending im-
munity to a foreign sovereign may destroy it at any time2 ' since it
was not a constitutional right, but rather a privilege extended by the
United States based on grace and comity.2 2
Although the narrow holding in The Schooner Exchange extended
immunity only to public warships of a foreign sovereign, the decision
was interpreted as granting absolute immunity to all foreign sover-
14 Von Dardel, 623 F. Supp. at 252-53.
15 Id. at 254.
16 The statute provides:
Subject to existing international agreements to which the United States
is a party at the time of enactment of this Act a foreign state shall be immune
from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States and of the States ex-
cept as provided in sections 1605-07 of this chapter.
28 U.S.C. § 1604 (1982).
17 Von Dardel, 623 F. Supp. at 254-55. The court expressly referred to the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3229, T.I.A.S. No. 7502, and
the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Pro-
tected Persons, Dec. 14, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975, T.I.A.S. No. 8532.
18 Von Dardel, 623 F. Supp. at 255-56.
11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812). The Schooner Exchange was a French warship that
docked in a Philadelphia port and was seized by U.S. citizens who claimed that it was an
American ship which had been illegally confiscated by the French. Id. at 117.
20 Id. at 147.
21 Id. at 146.
22 Id. at 136. Accord Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126 (1938); Berizzi
Bros., Co. v. The Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562 (1926); Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria,
461 U.S. 480 (1983).
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eigns. 23 Absolute sovereign immunity effectively exempted foreign
states from the jurisdiction of U.S. courts. 24
By the middle of the twentieth century, courts had substantially
eroded the doctrine of absolute immunity for foreign sovereigns. 25
Subsequently, courts developed the "restrictive theory" of sovereign
immunity under which immunity was granted only for the public acts
of a sovereign. Disputes arising out of the foreign state's private or
commercial acts were subject to the jurisdiction of U.S. courts. 26
The "restrictive theory" was designed to permit a foreign state to
conduct its public acts free from the possibility of suit in a U.S.
court. 27 In practice, the courts deferred to the U.S. State Depart-
ment to resolve claims for sovereign immunity. Because of foreign
policy considerations, however, the State Department's recommen-
dations on each claim for sovereign immunity often turned not on
the public or private nature of the act, but rather on the foreign pol-
icy implications of the claim. 28
In 1976 Congress enacted the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act 29 which sets forth a comprehensive set of standards by which
foreign sovereign immunity is granted.30 The Act precludes the ex-
ecutive branch from having any role in the determination of when
sovereign immunity shall be granted.3 1 Additionally, the Act assures
all parties that the immunity determination will be made on purely
legal grounds that comport with due process considerations.3 2
The Act sets forth a presumption of immunity for the foreign
state subject to a host of general exceptions.3 3 If the foreign state
23 Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 486; Von Mehren, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976,
17 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 33, 39-40 (1978).
24 Von Mehren, supra note 23, at 34. The theory of sovereign immunity embraced by
the courts was in step with early nineteenth-century theories of absolute sovereignty. Id.
25 In Exparte Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 588 (1943), the Court established a new procedure
of granting immunity at the request of the State Department. It had become an accepted
practice for the State Department to make recommendations upon claims of foreign sover-
eigns for immunity. Id. Thus, in Republic of Mex. v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30 (1945), the
Court established parameters on its rulings on immunity claims by its determination that
because of the sensitive nature of foreign relations, the Court would defer to the executive
branch's recommendations. Id. at 35.
26 Tate, Changed Policy Concerning the Granting of Sovereign Immunity to Foreign Sovereigns,
26 DEP'T ST. BULL. 984 (1952); see Note, Federal Question Jurisdiction-The Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act of 1976, 17 CREIGHTON L. REV. 885, 897 (1984).
27 Victory Transport Inc. v. Comisaria General, 336 F.2d 354, 360 (2d Cir. 1965).
28 Note, Suits by Foreigners Against Foreign States in United States Courts: A Selective Expan-
sion ofJurisdiction, 90 YALE I.J. 1861, 1863 (1981).
29 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, supra note 1.
30 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605, 1607 (1982).
3' H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94TH CONG., 2d Sess. 7, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 6604, 6606 [hereinafter H.R. REP. No. 1487, with pages cited to 1976 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEwS).
32 H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 31, 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at
6605-06.
33 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (1982). See supra note 16.
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waives immunity3 4 or engages in a commercial activity having a di-
rect connection with the United States, 35 immunity from suit will not
be granted. Similarly, disputes concerning rights to property with a
sufficient connection to the United States which is confiscated in vio-
lation of international law will not give rise to the immunity defense
to a foreign sovereign. 36 Finally, if the foreign state faces claims
either to recover damages for certain torts37 or to enforce a maritime
law, 38 the sovereign immunity defense will be denied. Without this
defense, the foreign state may be subject to the jurisdiction of U.S.
courts.
34 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1) (1982). The statute provides:
(a) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of
the United States or of the States in any case-
(1) in which the foreign state has waived its immunity either explicitly or
by implication, notwithstanding any withdrawal of the waiver which the for-
eign state may purport to effect except in accordance with the terms of the
waiver.
Id.
35 Id. § 1605(a)(2). The statute provides that immunity will not be granted in any
case:
(2) in which the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in
the United States by the foreign state; or upon an act performed in the
United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state
elsewhere; or upon an act outside the territory of the United States in con-
nection with a commercial act of the foreign state elsewhere and that act
causes a direct effect in the United States.
Id.
36 Id. § 1605(a)(3), (4). The statute provides that immunity will not be granted in any
case:
(3) in which rights in property taken in violation of international law are
in issue and that property or any property exchanged for such property is
present in the United States in connection with a commercial activity carried
on in the United States by the foreign state; or that property or any property
exchanged for such property is owned or operated by an agency or instru-
mentality and is engaged in a commercial activity in the United States;
(4) in which rights in property in the United States acquired by succes-
sion or gift or rights in immovable property situated in the United States are
in issue.
Id.
37 Id. § 1605(a)(5). The statute provides that immunity will not be granted in any
case:
(5) not otherwise encompassed in paragraph (2) above, in which money
damages are sought against a foreign state for personal injury or death, or
damage to or loss of property, occurring in the United States and caused by
the tortious act or omission of that foreign state or of any official or em-
ployee of that foreign state while acting within the scope of his office or em-
ployment; except this claim shall not apply to-
(B) any claim arising out of malicious prosecution, abuse of process, li-
bel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights.
Id.
38 Id. § 1605(b). The statute provides:
(b) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of the
courts of the United States in any case in which a suit in admiralty is brought
to enforce a maritime lien against a vessel or a cargo of the foreign state,
which maritime lien is based upon a commercial activity of the foreign state[;]
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The legislative history of the FSIA provides guidelines as to the
intended scope of the Act. In enacting the FSIA, Congress intended
that in order for an immunity exception to apply, there must be
either some connection between the claim and the United States, or
an express or implied waiver of its immunity by the foreign state.39
In testimony before the House Judiciary Committee, the Act's princi-
pal draftsman, Bruno Ristau, cautioned that "our courts [might be]
turned into small international courts of claim . . .open . . .to all
comers to litigate any dispute which any private party may have with
any foreign state anywhere in the world."' 40 By requiring some rela-
tionship between the claim and the United States, Congress pro-
tected against the danger of unlimited litigation. Ristau further
testified that the Act was designed not only to grant U.S. courts juris-
diction over foreign entities engaging in commercial activities in the
U.S., but also to give American parties effective redress in domestic
courts for disputes arising in the United States. 4 '
Since the passage of the FSIA in 1976, there has been much liti-
gation involving the proper application of the Act. In Yessenin-Volpin
v. Novosti Press Agency, 42 one of the first cases applying the FSIA, the
plaintiff brought suit against two Soviet entities for publishing alleg-
edly libelous articles outside the United States which were distrib-
uted in the United States. 43 The district court noted that under the
FSIA a court "must engage... in a close examination of the underly-
ing cause of action" to determine whether sovereign immunity will
be granted. 44 If the cause of action falls within one of the exceptions
to immunity set forth in section 1605 of the Act, 45 then immunity is
not appropriate. 46
The plaintiff alleged that the Soviet Union's conduct fell within
the exception for commercial activity performed elsewhere which has
a direct effect in the United States.47 The court held, however, that
the conduct of the defendants did not amount to "commercial activ-
ity" as defined by the FSIA,48 but rather was "official commentary of
39 H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 31, 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 6612.
40 Hearings on H. R. 3493 Before the Subcomm. on Claims and Governmental Relations of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (1973).
41 Id.
42 443 F. Supp. 849 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
43 Id. at 854-55.
44 Id. at 851.
45 See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
46 Yessenin-Volpin, 443 F. Supp. at 854.
47 Id. at 855. See supra note 35.
48 Yessenin-Volpin, 443 F. Supp. at 856. The court relied on 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d)
(1982) which states:
(d) A "commercial activity" means either a regular course of commer-
cial conduct or a particular commercial transaction or act. The commercial
character of an activity shall be determined by reference to the nature of the
course of conduct or particular transaction or act, rather than by reference to
its purpose.
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the Soviet government."'49 Since the Soviet Union's activity was es-
sentially public or governmental in nature, the court granted juris-
dictional immunity, noting that to do otherwise would "contravene
the spirit of sovereign immunity and the letter of the [FSIA]." 50
Two years later, in Letelier v. Republic of Chile5 1 the District Court
for the District of Columbia addressed the issue whether a defend-
ant's failure to formally appear in an action was a waiver of the sover-
eign immunity defense. 52 The plaintiffs brought suit against the
Republic of Chile alleging that the Chilean government directed the
assassination of a dissident leader in the United States.53 Utilizing
diplomatic notes sent to the U.S. State Department, the Chilean gov-
ernment challenged the district court's jurisdiction. 54 Although the
Chilean government did not meet the preferred procedure under the
FSIA by making a formal court appearance, 55 the court nonetheless
addressed the issue whether sovereign immunity existed. 56
Because Chile consistently opposed the court's jurisdiction, al-
beit in an unorthodox manner, the district court struck down an ear-
lier default judgment against the Republic of Chile for its failure to
make a court appearance. The court found jurisdiction over the for-
eign state based on the immunity exception set forth in section
1605(a)(5) of the FSIA.5 7 Thus, the Chilean government's failure to
make a formal appearance did not amount to a waiver of the sover-
eign immunity defense. Although the district court's finding ofjuris-
diction over the Chilean government was reversed on appeal, 58 the
district court's recognition that jurisdiction must be based on the ex-
ceptions to immunity set forth in the FSIA and not on the foreign
state's failure to appear in court, was implicitly approved by the Sec-
ond Circuit Court of Appeals. 59
The exceptions to sovereign immunity under the FSIA were also
examined in Persinger v. Islamic Republic of Iran.60 In that case, the
plaintiffs were a former U.S. hostage and his parents who brought
Id.
41 Yessenin-Volpin, 443 F. Supp at 856.
50 Id.
51 488 F. Supp. 665 (D.D.C. 1980), rev'don other grounds, 748 F.2d 790 (2d Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2656 (1985).
52 Id. at 667.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Id. at 668. Although the FSIA contains no express provisions dealing with the
procedure for raising the sovereign immunity defense, HouseJudiciary committee reports
concerning the FSIA state that "sovereign immunity is an affirmative defense which must
be specially pleaded." H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 31, 1976 U.S. CoSE CONG. & AD-
MIN. NEWS at 6615.
56 Letelier, 488 F. Supp. at 668.
57 Id. at 673. See supra note 37.
58 748 F.2d 790 (2d Cir. 1984).
51) Id. at 793.
60 729 F.2d 835 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 880 (1984).
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suit against Iran for injuries inflicted during the seizure and deten-
tion of American personnel in the U.S. embassy in Teheran. 6' In
granting sovereign immunity to Iran from such claims, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reasoned that
in determining a claim of sovereign immunity a court's inquiry must
begin with the presumption that a foreign state shall be immune
from the jurisdiction of U.S. courts. 62 The court's analysis should
then focus on the exceptions to the immunity established by the
FSIA.63 The court concluded that U.S. embassies abroad are not
part of U.S. territory for jurisdictional purposes; therefore, Congress
did not intend to exercise jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns for
tortious acts committed on U.S. embassy premises. 64 According to
the Persinger court, the tort and the injury must occur in the United
States to fall within the section 1605(a)(5) exception to the FSIA. 65
Other courts dealing with facts similar to those in Persinger have
been consistent with that court's holding.66 In McKeel v. Islamic Re-
public of Iran,67 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the
Persinger court in holding that U.S. embassies are not within the terri-
torial jurisdiction of the United States. Therefore, the exception to
immunity set forth by section 1605(a)(5) for "personal injury . . .
occurring in the United States and caused by the tortious act or
omission of that foreign state" 68 did not apply to Iran.69 The court
explained that "nothing in the legislative history suggests that Con-
gress intended to assert jurisdiction over foreign states for events
occurring wholly within their own territory." 70
The Supreme Court has also recognized the need for some de-
gree of U.S. interest in a court proceeding in order for the action to
fall within the sovereign immunity exceptions. In Verlinden v. Central
Bank of Nigeria,7 1 a breach of contract action brought by a Dutch cor-
poration against an entity of the Nigerian government, the Supreme
Court upheld the constitutionality of the FSIA. 72 The Court held
that the legislative history of the Act does not reveal an intent to limit
(', Id. at 837.
62 Id. at 838. See supra note 33.
1!-' Id. at 838. See supra notes 34-38.
64 Id. at 839.
65 Id. at 842. See supra note 37.
(i4 "In Williams v. Iran, 692 F.2d 151 (D.C. Cir. 1982), and Lauterbach v. Iran, 692
F.2d 150 (D.C. Cir. 1982), the [Persinger] court affirmed lower court judgments dismissing
plaintiffs' claims against Iran for the reasons stated in [the Persinger opinion]." 729 F.2d at
838, n.3.
(17 722 F.2d 582 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 880 (1984). Twelve former
hostages and the wives of two ex-hostages brought suit against Iran for damages suffered
during and after their captivity. Id. at 585.
68 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5) (1982). See supra note 37.
69 AcKeel, 722 F.2d at 587.
70 Id. at 588.
71 461 U.S. 480 (1983).
72 Id. at 494.
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the jurisdiction to actions brought only by U.S. citizens. 73 The Court
added, however, that Congress enacted "substantive provisions re-
quiring some form of substantial contact with the United States for
United States courts to assert subject matter jurisdiction. ' ' 74 In dic-
tum, the Court noted that even if a foreign state has waived its immu-
nity, the doctrine of forum non conveniens 75 can still be applied. 76
Thus, despite a waiver of its immunity, a foreign state may not con-
sent to jurisdiction in the United States for an act wholly unrelated to
the United States if a foreign forum would be more appropriate.
In the recent case of Frolova v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics ,77
a U.S. citizen brought an action against the Soviet Union for dam-
ages related to the Soviet Union's twelve-month delay in permitting
the plaintiff's husband to emigrate to the United States from Mos-
cow. 78 The plaintiff argued that the Soviet Union should be denied
sovereign immunity because the FSIA is "[s]ubject to existing inter-
national agreements," ' 79 such as the United Nations Charter 80 and
the Helsinki Accords, 8 ' which may be enforced by private litigants. 82
The court noted that although treaties ratified by the United States
are the supreme law of the land, 83 such agreements may not be the
basis of claims in private lawsuits unless they are intended to be self-
executing. 84 Whether the parties intend for the treaty to be self-exe-
cuting should be determined by examining the language and pur-
pose of the treaty.8 5
The plaintiff relied on articles 55 and 56 of the United Nations
73 Id. at 490.
74 Id.
75 The doctrine offorum non conveniens refers to the "discretionary power of [a] court
to decline jurisdiction when [the] convenience of [the] parties and [the] ends of justice
would be better served if [the] action were brought and tried in another forum." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 589 (5th ed. 1979).
76 Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 490, n.15.
77 761 F.2d 370 (7th Cir. 1985).
78 Id. at 371.
79 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (1982). See supra note 16.
80 U.N. CHARTER arts. 55, 56.
81 Helsinki Accords (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Final Act),
73 DEP'T ST. BULL. 323 (1975).
82 Frolova, 761 F.2d at 373.
83 Id.; see U.S. CONST. art. VI.
84 Frolova, 761 F.2d at 373. To determine whether a treaty is self-executing, a court
will examine a number of factors:
(l) the language and purposes of the agreement as a whole; (2) the cir-
cumstances surrounding its execution; (3) the nature of the obligations im-
posed by the agreement; (4) the availability and feasibility of alternative
enforcement mechanisms; (5) the implications of permitting a private right;
and (6) the capability of the judiciary to resolve the dispute.
Id. The issue of whether a treaty is self-executing is a matter of interpretation for the
courts. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 154(l) (1965).
85 Frolova, 761 F.2d at 373.
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Charter8 6 and on certain provisions in the Helsinki Accords8 7 deal-
ing with (1) contacts and regular meetings on the basis of family ties;
(2) reunification of families; and (3) marriage between citizens of dif-
ferent states. The Frolova court held that the articles from the United
Nations Charter were only "declarations of principles, not a code of
legal rights."88 Similarly, the court found that the Helsinki Accords
"create obligations on the signatory countries and establish goals
which the nations will try to reach on their own." 89 No right to en-
force either agreement is conferred upon individual citizens. 90
Thus, the court concluded that neither treaty is intended to be self-
executing. 9 1
The plaintiff in Frolova also argued that the Soviet Union had
implicitly waived its defense of sovereign immunity by its failure to
86 Article 55 provides:
With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being
which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based
on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination among
peoples, the United Nations shall promote:
(c) universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and funda-
mental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or
religion.
U.N. CHARTER, art. 55.
Article 56 provides:
All members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in co-
operation with the organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth
in Article 55.
U.N. CHARTER, art. 56.
87 The section on marriage between citizens of different states sets forth:
The participating States will examine favourably and on the basis of hu-
manitarian considerations requests for exit or entry permits from persons
who have decided to marry a citizen from another participating State.
In dealing with requests from couples from different participating
States, once married, to enable them and their minor children of their mar-
riage to transfer their permanent residence to a State in which either one is
normally a resident, the participating States will also apply the provisions
accepted for family reunification.
Helsinki Accords (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Final Act), 73
DEP'T ST. BULL. 340 (1975).
The provisions on family reunification state in relevant part:
The participating States will deal in a positive and humanitarian spirit
with the applications of persons who wish to be reunited with members of
their family, with special attention being given to requests of an urgent char-
acter ....
They will deal with applications in this field as expeditiously as possible.
Until members of the same family are reunited meetings and contacts
between them may take place in accordance with the modalities for contacts
on the basis of family ties.
d.
88 Frolova, 761 F.2d at 374.
89 Id. at 375.
9() Id. at 374.
9, Id. at 374-76.
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appear in the action. 92 In finding that the Soviet Union had not
waived its immunity, the court reasoned that "even in cases in which
the defendant has not entered an appearance, the district court has
an obligation to satisfy itself that the defense of sovereign immunity
is not available before it has subject matter jurisdiction. ' 9 3 Dis-
missing the suit, the Frolova court held that the Soviet Union neither
explicitly waived its sovereign immunity by signing the United Na-
tions Charter and Helsinki Accords, nor implicitly waived its immu-
nity by failing to make a formal court appearance. 94
The court's assertion of subject matter jurisdiction in Von Dardel
is inconsistent with the above precedents. The Von Dardel court's
holding that the Soviet Union's failure to affirmatively plead the de-
fense of sovereign immunity was an implicit waiver of the defense is
contrary to the presumption of sovereign immunity set forth in the
Act. 9 5 The court's conclusion is contrary to the Frolova and Letelier
analyses which require that even if the foreign state fails to appear to
affirmatively plead the sovereign immunity defense, the court must
still examine whether the defendant's conduct falls within one of the
exceptions to immunity.9 6
The Von Dardel court also concluded that the FSIA should be
interpreted consistently with universally recognized principles of in-
ternational law.9 7 When a "clear and egregious violation of a well-
established and universally recognized standard of international law
[occurs], courts have recognized the need for an appropriate exer-
cise of jurisdiction.-9 8 In fact, courts have rarely exercised such a
power. The court in Von Dardel relied on the exceptional case of
Bernstein v. N.V Nederlandsche - Amerikaansche Stoomlvaart - Maat-
schappif.9 9 The Bernstein case involved extraordinary circumstances in
post-World War II Europe concerning the settlement of reparation
92 Id. at 378.
93 Id. The court also relied on Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S.
480 (1983), which pointed out that "[u]nder the Act ... subject matter jurisdiction turns
on the existence of an exception to foreign sovereign immunity, 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a). Ac-
cordingly, even if the foreign state does not enter an appearance to assert an immunity
defense, a district court still must determine that immunity is unavailable under the Act."
Id. at 493 n.20.
114 Frolova, 761 F.2d at 374-78.
95 See supra notes 16, 33 and accompanying text.
'90 See supra notes 51-57 and 92-94 and accompanying text. Similarly, other courts
have been reluctant to find a waiver of immunity based on the foreign state's absence in
the litigation. In Castro v. Saudia Arabia, 510 F. Supp. 309, 311-12 (W.D. Tex. 1980), the
court found that the foreign state did not waive its right to sovereign immunity by failing
to answer prior to the issuance of a default judgment. Accord Canadian Overseas Ores Ltd.
v. Compania de Acero del Pacifico S.A., 727 F.2d 274, 277-78 (2d Cir. 1984).
!7 I'on Dardel, 623 F. Supp. at 253. The court does not explain what these principles
of international law are.
98 Id.
99 210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954).
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claims for property confiscated by Nazi officials. 100 The Bernstein
court found subject matter jurisdiction after the U.S. State Depart-
ment recommended a policy of allowing victims of the war accessibil-
ity to U.S. courts.' 0 ' The Bernstein court, therefore, deferred to the
State Department's "supervening expression of Executive policy," 02
and not to an overriding concern for principles of international law.
Although the Von Dardel court recognized that Congress did not
make a specific reference to the doctrine of international law when it
enacted the FSIA, it discounted the omission as not of primary im-
portance to the Act. 10 3 The court stated that if the FSIA is inter-
preted to bar suits against foreign governments for violations of
international law, it would preempt other U.S. laws designed to safe-
guard the rights of diplomats 10 4 and other internationally protected
persons.105 Thus, the court's holding that a foreign plaintiff may
bring suit against a foreign state in a U.S. court for violations of gen-
eral principles of international law creates a new substantive right
under the FSIA which was not the intention of the legislation. The
purpose of the legislation was, in part, to codify the "restrictive"
doctrine of sovereign immunity as recognized in international law
and as practiced since 1952;106 the Act was not intended to create
new substantive rights. The FSIA sets forth the "sole and exclusive
standards to be used in resolving questions of sovereign immunity
raised by foreign states. '"107 The language of the statute does not
create an exception to sovereign immunity for alleged violations of
international law. ' 0 8
Oddly, the Von Dardel court denied immunity to the Soviet
Union for violations of international law regarding a Swedish diplo-
mat while other U.S. courts have granted immunity to Iran for the
violation of international law regarding American diplomats.' 0 9 The
o00 Id. at 376.
Io Id.
102 Id.
103 Von Dardel, 623 F. Supp. at 254.
104 The Alien Torts Claims Act provides that "[t]he district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law
of nations or a treaty of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1982).
105 28 U.S.C. § 1116 (1982). The statute provides:
(a) Whoever kills or attempts to kill a foreign official, official guest, or
internationally protected person shall be punished ....
(c) If the victim of an offense under subsection (a) is an internationally
protected person, the United States may exercise jurisdiction over the of-
fense if the alleged offender is present in the United States, irrespective of
the place where the offense was committed or the nationality of the victim or
the alleged offender.
Id. See also 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (1982).
)( H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 31, 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 6605.
107 Id. at 6610.
108 See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
109 See supra notes 60-70 and accompanying text.
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kidnapping of U.S. embassy personnel in Iran in 1979 has a much
more substantial connection with the United States than the kidnap-
ping of a Swedish diplomat in Eastern Europe in 1945. Yet, the rul-
ing in Persinger and subsequent cases clearly demonstrated that the
connection between Iran's conduct and the United States was insuffi-
cient to deny the immunity defense to Iran." 0
The Von Dardel court also relied on international agreements be-
tween the Soviet Union and the United States to find jurisdiction.
Section 1604 of the FSIA provides that immunity is subject to inter-
national agreements to which the United States is a party."' The
court concluded that where the substantive provisions of the Act
conflict with any international agreement, the provisions must be
preempted to the extent necessary to allow the full application of
such agreement." 2 The court cited two treaties to which both the
United States and the Soviet Union are signatories" 13 and found that
if the FSIA shielded the Soviet Union from liability for its conduct,
the Act would be in conflict with the terms of the treaties and would
thwart the effective operation of these international agreements. 14
The Frolova court noted that a treaty must be self-executing in order
to give rise to a private claim. 1 5 If a treaty is not self-executing, the
relationship between a private claim and the treaty is too tenuous to
create a substantive right which may be enforced in U.S. courts."16
Each of the treaties cited by the Von Dardel court contains a pro-
vision by which its terms may be enforced."t 7 Although the Soviet
Union signed both treaties, it chose not to be bound by the enforce-
ment provisions of either treaty, indicating a clear intention that the
11O Id.
''l 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (1982). See supra note 16.
112 Von Dardel, 623 F. Supp. at 254-55.
113 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3229, T.I.A.S.
No. 7502; Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internation-
ally Protected Persons, Dec. 14, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975, T.I.A.S. No. 8532.
114 Von Dardel, 623 F. Supp. at 255. Article 29 of the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations provides that "[t]he person of a diplomatic agent shall be inviolable.' He shall
not be liable to any form of arrest or detention. The receiving state shall treat him with
due respect and shall take all appropriate steps to prevent any attack on his person, free-
dom, or dignity." Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T.
3229, T.I.A.S. No. 7502.
Article 2 of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes provides
that "[tihe intentional commission of ... a murder, kidnapping or other attack upon the
person or liberty of an internationally protected person... shall be made by each State
Party a crime under its internal law." Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Dec. 14, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975, T.I.A.S.
No. 8532.
1 15 See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
''6 Dreyfus v. Von Finck, 534 F.2d 24, 29 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 835
(1976); see also supra note 84.
117 The Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, Apr.
18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3374, T.I.A.S. No. 7502, accompanied the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations. The Optional Protocol provided that disputes concerning the inter-
pretation or application of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations should be de-
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treaties not be self-executing.' I8 Before concluding that a foreign
state may be sued in the United States, U.S. courts have required
convincing evidence that a foreign state intended to waive sovereign
immunity when ratifying a treaty. 119 Clearly, the Soviet Union did
not intend to submit itself to claims by private litigants in U.S. courts
based on these two treaties.
Additionally, the Von Dardel court examined principles of inter-
national law in concluding that the Soviet Union had implicitly
waived its immunity. Pursuant to section 1605(a)(1) of the FSIA, 120
a foreign state may either explicitly or implicitly waive immunity.
The Von Dardel court determined that the Soviet Union had explicitly
recognized fundamental principles of diplomatic immunity as ex-
pressed in certain international treaties. 12' Through its alleged
breach of the principles encompassed in those agreements, the So-
viet Union had implicitly waived its immunity. 122 A contrary result,
according to the court, would "rob each of those agreements of sub-
stantive effect, and would render meaningless the act of the Soviet
Union in signing them."' 2 3
Although the case law in the area of an implicit waiver of sover-
eign immunity is not settled,' 2 4 it seems clear that an implicit waiver
such as that found by the Von Dardel court was not intended by the
drafters of the FSIA. The legislative history of the Act cites examples
of implicit waivers which require affirmative action, such as an agree-
ment that the law of another country will govern the contract, or a
responsive pleading in which the defense of sovereign immunity is
not raised.' 2 5 Since the Act provides no precise limitation on the
implied waiver doctrine, some commentators have argued that
courts should be able to expand the doctrine to encompass forms of
cided by the International Court ofJustice. Id. art. I. The Soviet Union chose not to be
bound by the Vienna Convention and did not sign the Optional Protocol.
Also, the Convention of the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes contained a provi-
sion compelling disputes between states concerning the interpretation and application of
the Convention to be resolved by the International Court ofJustice. Art. 13, para. 1, 28
U.S.T. 1975, T.I.A.S. No. 8532. Pursuant to article 13 of the Convention, the Soviet
Union declared that it did not consider itself bound by paragraph I of the article, Id. at
para. 2.
1 See Frolova, 761 F.2d at 376.
I'" d. at 378. See O'Connell Machinery Co. v. MV. Americana, 734 F.2d 115 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1086 (1984); Harris Corp. v. National Iranian Radio and Televi-
sion, 691 F.2d 1344 (11 th Cir. 1982); Skeen v. Federative Republic of Brazil, 566 F. Supp.
1414 (D.D.C. 1983).
120 See supra note 34.
121 See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
122 Von Dardel, 623 F. Supp. at 256.
123 Id.
124 Note, The Foreign Sovereign Immnmitie psct, 3 N.C... INT'L L. & CoM. REG., 206. 219
(1977).
125 H.R. REt'. No. 1487, supra note 31. 1976 U.S. CoDE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws at 6617.
An express waiver would be an explicit act such as a waiver of immunity contained in
either a treaty with a foreign state or a contract with a private party. Id.
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implied waivers not cited in the legislative history. 12 6 Most courts,
however, have interpreted the Act restrictively requiring adherence
to either the examples set forth in the legislative history or similar
actions. 127
The Von Dardel decision is strikingly deficient in its analysis of
certain important issues which it deemed irrelevant to its inquiry.
Most commentators agree that the FSIA requires some substantive
contact with the United States before subject matter jurisdiction can
be found. 128 The Supreme Court in Verlinden interpreted the lan-
guage of the Act as restricting the class of potential plaintiffs by re-
quiring substantive contact with the United States. 129 In Von Dardel
the court ignored the negligible relationship between the plaintiff's
claim, the defendant's alleged misconduct, and the United States,
and found subject matter jurisdiction without a showing of substan-
tive contact between the cause of action and the United States.' 30
The Von Dardel court also failed to discuss the doctrine of forum
non conveniens.' 31 While the United States may have an interest in
allowing its courts to resolve some disputes between foreign
states,' 3 2 it may not be convenient for the parties to litigate the case
in the United States. Since the Act does not affect the doctrine of
forum non conveniens, suits should be brought in the foreign forum if it
will be more convenient for the parties, or if the foreign state has a
greater interest in the suit.' 33 Whether U.S. interests may be ad-
versely affected by resolving a dispute in U.S. courts should also be
considered.
The plaintiffs in Von Dardel were Swedish citizens bringing an
126 Note, supra note 124, at 219 (courts should be free to expand the doctrine of im-
plicit waiver); Note, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976: Giving the Plaintif His Day in
Court, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 543, 553 (1977) (scope of implied waiver should be given wide
breadth).
127 Frolova, 761 F.2d at 378 (no waiver absent a conscious decision to take part in the
litigation and a failure to raise the immunity defense); Castro, 510 F. Supp. at 312 (no
waiver despite defendant's failure to answer timely); Ipitrade Int'l v. Republic of Nigeria,
465 F. Supp. 824, 826 (D.D.C. 1978)(waiver based on agreement to arbitrate in foreign
states).
128 Note, Federal QuestionJurisdiction, 17 CREIGHTON L. REV. 885, 912 (1984); Note, For-
eign Plaintiffs May Constitutionally Sue a Foreign State Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act on
a State Cause of Action in a United States Federal Court, 19 TEx. INT'L L.J. 499, 510 (1984); Note,
Subject 11atterJurisdiction and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 68 VA. L. REV. 893,
918 (1982); Note, Suits by Foreigners, 90 YALE L.J. 1861, 1875-79 (1981).
129 Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 490.
130 The action involves foreign plaintiffs bringing suit against the Soviet Union for
alleged misconduct against a foreign diplomat in the Soviet Union commencing over 40
years ago. Clearly, the action has no relationship with the United States.
131 See supra note 75.
132 Interests protected by allowing foreign party suits in U.S. courts include suits
which involve debts incurred in the United States, undesirable behavior affecting the
United States, or a substantive law in the United States of which a party seeks to take
advantage. Note, Suits By Foreigners, supra note 128, at 1868-71.
133 Id. at 1871-72.
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action on behalf of a Swedish diplomat against the Soviet Union for
conduct performed within the Soviet Union. Based on the doctrine
offorum non conveniens, Sweden had a greater interest than the United
States in determining the status of its diplomat and recovering dam-
ages from the Soviet Union for his treatment. The convenience of
calling witnesses and obtaining evidence would further justify bring-
ing the suit in Sweden.
The Von Dardel court also failed to consider the ramifications of
its decision. The Von Dardel interpretation of the FSIA invites a
logjam in already-crowded federal courts by placing the United
States in the unenviable position of trying to police the world. Many
foreign states may object to defending actions in U.S. courts which
could have been brought in the foreign state.134 Yet, the holding in
Von Dardel places U.S. courts in the position of providing a forum for
a broad class of foreign plaintiffs.
Ramifications of the decision also extend into the realm of for-
eign policy. Although the FSIA specifically precludes foreign policy
considerations in the determination of each claim for sovereign im-
munity, foreign policy implications are inevitably involved. The ex-
tension of jurisdiction over the Soviet Union or any other foreign
state in the manner used in Von Dardel may affect the sensitive nature
of U.S. foreign relations. Not only may the foreign state cool rela-
tions with the United States, but it also may retaliate by providing its
own courts as a forum for suits against the United States by foreign
plaintiffs.
The plaintiffs in Von Dardel were not of the type that Congress
intended to allow into U.S. courts by enacting the FSIA. Although
the plaintiffs' claim had no substantive contact with the United
States, the Von Dardel court extended jurisdiction. In addition, the
court's finding that the Soviet Union implicitly waived the sovereign
immunity defense by failing to participate in the litigation is contrary
to the presumption of immunity set forth in the Act and is misaligned
with other courts' interpretations of the Act. Moreover, the Von
Dardel court's finding of an explicit waiver was based on the Soviet
Union's agreement to treaties which the Soviet Union expressly in-
tended not to be self-executing. Finally, the court's decision ignores
judicial doctrines, such as forum non conveniens, and disregards foreign
policy considerations, such as the ruling's effect on the foreign state.
In future decisions regarding sovereign immunity, U.S. federal
courts should be sensitive to the shortcomings of the Von Dardel
court's holding and should apply a more narrow construction of the
FSIA.
MATrHEW B. MERRELL
134 Id. at 1874.
